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Chapter 9 
BEST PRACTICE? ELIMINATINGMICROFINANCE 
SUBSIDIES IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS: 
THE CASE OF BOUGAINVILLE 
Judith Shaw and Matthew Clarke 
School of Social Science and Planning, RMIT University 
Melbourne Victoria 3000, Australia 
ABSTRACT 
Microfinance can be harnessed to serve both relief and development purposes in post-
conflict environments, supporting survival, reconstruction and social reconciliation 
objectives in the immediate conflict aftermath, as well as longer-term economic re-
building through microenterprise development. Independence from donor subsidies is 
widely viewed as a desirable goal in the microfinance industry, and a number of donors 
are building full cost recovery objectives into their support for post-conflict microfinance 
programs. The appropriateness of the full cost recovery paradigm in post-conflict 
environments is questionable, given the high operating costs faced by post-conflict 
micro finance agencies, weak demand for the most profitable microfinance services, and 
limitations on rapid improvements in local economic capacity, particularly in remote 
. areas. This paper reviews the issues raised by full cost recovery in post-conflict 
environments, with particular reference to a microfinance scheme in Bougainville, a 
province of Papua New Guinea currently in recovery from a prolonged period of armed 
conflict. 
INTRODUCTION 
The provision of effective development aid, as distinct from short-term humanitarian 
assistance, in post-conflict environments (PCEs) is an issue that has lacked adequate attention 
and reflection within the development literature. Microfinance - the provision of small-scale 
financial services to low-income clients - can be harnessed to serve both relief and 
development purposes. Carefully designed microfinance programs can support survival, 
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reconstruction and social reconciliation objectives in the immediate conflict aftermath. In the 
longer term, microfinance institutions (MFIs) can assist in the re-building of economic assets 
and social capital. Since the mid-1990s microfinance interventions have been implemented in 
several post-conflict countries including Rwanda, Mozambique, Cambodia, Bosnia and 
Kosovo. 
Within the microfinance industry independence of donor subsidies is widely viewed as a 
desirable goal, and a number of donors are building full cost recovery objectives into their 
support for post-conflict microfinance programs. The appropriateness of the full cost recovery 
paradigm in post-conflict environments is questionable, however, given the high operating 
costs faced by post-conflict microfinance agencies, weak demand for most profitable 
microfinance services, and limitations on rapid improvements in local economic capacity, 
particularly in remote areas. 
In this paper, issues in the application of a cost recovery model to post-conflict 
microfinance (PCMF) will be explored for Bougainville, a province of Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) currently in recovery from a prolonged period of armed conflict. Since 1998 BHM, 
supported by the official Australian aid agency AusAID, has provided small-scale savings 
and loans services to conflict-affected communities. The BHM is currently being redesigned, 
with a proposal to shift its funding base towards a cost recovery footing over the next three 
years. The following section reviews the emerging literature on PCMF and debates on the 
commercialisation of micro finance. The third section briefly describes the background to the 
Bougainville conflict. The fourth section introduces the BHM, highlighting issues and 
constraints facing the commercialization of micro finance in a PCE. 
MICROFINANCE COMMERCIALISATION IN PeES 
In recent years there has been considerable debate on the extent to which MFIs should 
aim to finance their operations without recourse to donor support. Practitioners distinguish 
three levels of financial sustainability. At the lowest level, subSidy dependence, an MFI is 
unable to cover any of its costs and relies entirely on donor funds. At the second level, 
operational self-sufficiency (OSS), the agency covers its operating costs from fees and 
interest revenue, but relies on subsidies, in the form of donor grants or low-interest loans, to 
meet its financing costs. At the highest level, fulljinancial self-sufficiency (FSS), the MFI is 
entirely independent of donors, meeting its operating and financing costs from deposit 
mobilisation andlor commercial financial markets. Most observers agree that as a minimum 
requirement, MFls should strive for OSS, aiming to earn enough revenue from fees and loan-
interest to cover their day-to-day costs, but disagree on whether, over and above OSS, MFIs 
should meet the more demanding criterion ofFSS. 
Since the mid-1990s the 'institutionist' approach has emerged as the dominant paradigm 
within microfinance. Institutionists envisage an industry dominated by large, profit-seeking 
financially self-sufficient MFls, arguing that microfinance is better served by market-based 
approaches than concessional donor support. They see a limited role for donor support in . 
financing MFI start-ups and supporting technical and managerial progress towards FSS, but 
argue that in the long run, limitations on the magnitude and durability of donor support mean 
that broad, sustainable outreach can be achieved only by accessing commercial funding 
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sources (Gibbons and Meehan 2002). For institutionists, the main role of donors is to assist in 
building FSS institutions: having assured viability in one, they can move on to the next. Thus, 
many MFls receive donor funds on the premise that external assistance is a temporary 
measure and that they will eventually become entirely self-funding, and the progressive 
achievement ofFSS benchmarks is a condition of continued donor support. 
Major donors such as the World Bank's CGAP program and USAID, which are strong 
advocates of the institutionist position, support research and development programs aimed at 
identifying and promoting 'best practices' which facilitate commercialisation. A key theme of 
the best practices literature is the setting of fees and interest rates at full cost recovery levels 
which, given the cost structures of microfinance, are usually well above standard bank 
lending rates (Rosenberg 2002). Other themes focus on cost reduction through improved 
operating efficiency, the cutting of unprofitable 'non-core' services, and the identification of 
clients based on profitability rather than need. 
The institutionist view is' opposed by the 'welfarist' school, which holds that 
microfinance serves social objectives which usually justify ongoing donor support. Welfarists 
are concerned that in the push towards commercialisation, influential donors are steering 
MFls in a policy direction that is inconsistent with a social mission. They argue that profit-
maximising MFIs tend to move away from poor, high-risk client groups. As loan transaction 
costs are a more or less fixed quantity regardless of loan size, and as the most disadvantaged 
groups are relatively difficult to reach and likely to require more intensive interventions, 
programs concerned with their financial bottom-lines have a powerful incentive to avoid them 
in favour of larger, cheaper, lower-risk loans to non-poor clients. They point out that 
subsidies are necessary to support non-financial services such as training, business 
development and social intermediation, which by themselves are unlikely to generate 
commercial rates of return. Unsubsidised, these activities are likely to be reduced or 
discontinued by commercially-minded MFIs, with adverse impacts on the poorest and most 
marginalised, who tend to be the main beneficiaries of non-financial services. 
Welfarists argue that a 'one size fits all' commercial model ignores the diversity of 
micro finance services and of clients who can benefit from microfinance. They agree that there 
is room for commercially viable MFIs that target the less poor. Fully commercialised 
business-oriented programs may generate significant social benefits by serving non-poor 
clients who are excluded from the formal banking sector, which in many developing countries 
caters only to elites. There is also a place for donor-funded programs, which operate from 
humanitarian motives and are not commercially profitable. The two should not be confused, 
however. There is a danger that pressures for the adoption of commercial practices will 
compromise the effectiveness of poverty-focused programs. 
Evidence that some clients are willing and able to pay full cost-recovery interest rates 
indicates that FSS may be a realistic goal in certain development contexts (MicroBanking 
Bulletin 2003). There is ongoing debate however, over its appropriateness as a universal 
blueprint, with concerns that an exclusive focus on institutional performance indicators may 
jeopardise other social and poverty reduction objectives (Woller et aL 2001; Morduch 2000). 
As PCMF is a relatively new field, there is little data on the impacts of commercialisation on 
PCMFI operations and clients. 'Best practice' in a post-conflict context remains a largely 
unexplored field. The pursuit ofFSS is likely to be problematic in 'difficult environments' -
for example, communities in which HIV/AIDS is endemic, in recovery from natural disaster 
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or armed conflict, or simply where clients are very poor. Nevertheless, some donors have 
sought to build full cost recovery objectives into their support for post-conflict MFIs. 
In fact, the pursuit of FSS faces significant hurdles in PCEs. Households and 
communities in recovery from conflict have specific requirements, which call for a shift in 
emphasis away from traditional income promotion toward the less profitable obj ectives of 
reducing economic vulnerability and building social capital. Furthermore, the post-conflict 
setting imposes additional costs on MFIs. The remainder of this section discusses each set of 
factors in tum. 
REDUCING ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY 
The standard objective of most micro finance programs is income promotion: the creation 
of sustained improvements in household incomes through microenterprise development. Their 
focus is on microenterprise lending, sometimes supported by training, technology transfer and 
other non-financial business development services. More recently, practitioners have 
recognised the protectional capacity of microfinance. Protectional strategies aim not to 
increase incomes but to reduce economic vulnerability, ensuring continuity of access to basic 
needs through crisis periods. The focus is on the building of savings and small, short-term 
loans for consumption, housing, household assets, debt retirement, subsistence production 
and diversification of household income sources to spread risk (Sebstad and Cohen 2000). 
Protectional financial services may complement non-financial interventions supporting food 
security and the empowerment of particularly disadvantaged groups. They may provide a first 
step towards the re-building of livelihoods, assisting clients to reach a threshold of income 
security from which they can launch higher-risk, higher-return enterprises (Hulme and 
Mosley 1996, Sebstad and Cohen 2000, Zaman 1999). 
There is considerable evidence that micro finance can play an important protectional role 
In PCEs (Sebstad and Cohen 2000, Doyle 1998, Wilson 2001). In the immediate conflict 
aftermath, households may exhibit a 'post-war syndrome' characterised by low confidence, 
trust and motivation and reluctance to take on debt. As asset depletion and income instability 
increase both the probability and the consequences of a loss, households are risk-averse, often 
stating a preference for reducing consumption or working for wages rather than taking loans. 
The microfinance products most in demand in peEs are savings facilities, small, short-term 
cash loans and in-kind loans, used primarily for non-productive purposes. Where there is 
demand for microenterprise credit, the preference is for low-risk, low-value, fast-return 
working capital investments with low entry and exit costs, although demand for larger, 
longer-term loans for fixed capital investments increases over time (Wilson 2001, Williams et 
aI2001). 
BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
'Social capital' refers to norms and networks that foster trust, reciprocity and 
cooperation, thereby enhancing both efficiency and well-being. The building of social capital 
is generally seen as a complementary, second-order goal for microfinance, by contrast with 
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first-order promotional and protectional objectives. In non-conflict environments, the interest 
of practitioners in social capital is primarily instrumental, stemming from recognition of its 
critical role in supporting effective microfinance. In PCEs, however, where reconciliation and 
the revival of cooperative activity are community development priorities, the social capital-
building function of microfinance is accorded greater prominence as an objective in itself. 
Social capital development is both a precondition for and outcome of microfinance. The 
great innovation of microfinance lies in its substitution of physical with 'social' collateral 
through joint liability arrangements, in which each borrower's loan is guaranteed by a group 
of her peers, thereby enabling borrowers and lenders to participate in transactions which 
involve an otherwise unacceptable degree of risk (Narayan and Pritchett 1997). In addition, 
solidarity groups reduce transaction costs for the lender by transferring loan appraisal, 
approval, monitoring and collection functions to cooperative peer groups (Ito 2003). 
Reciprocally, the peer group model is well-adapted to support the building of social 
capital, and has been found to be particularly useful where programs seek to empower women 
and other marginalised groups (Anderson and Locker 2002, Rankin 2002, Barnes 1998). 
While practitioners are cautious about the use of microfinance interventions to 'engineer' 
reconciliation in PCEs, there is support for its use as a tool for reconciliation and the 
facilitation of grassroots cooperation, and evidence that peer group processes contribute to 
inter-ethnic cooperation between members, their neighbours and families (Doyle 1998, 
USAID 2001). The targeting of women is believed to promote reconciliation objectives 
through their empowerment as peace-makers (Doyle 1998). 
OPERATING COSTS 
PCMFIs face higher costs their counterparts in non-conflict environments. Weak social 
cohesion requires them to invest heavily in social capital building. Demand for institutional 
financial services is often weak, in part because low levels of intra-community trust lead to 
reluctance to participate in solidarity lending and savings schemes (Doyle 1998, Wilson 2001, 
Williams et al 2001). Group-based methodologies require members to manage funds and 
maintain records, and to possess good information about other members. Where financial 
skills are scarce or, as in situations of high population mobility or unresolved intra-
community tensions, levels of trust and information are low, groups may take some time to 
become functional, requiring extra social mobilisation efforts (Kuehnast 2001, Doyle 1998, 
Nagarajan 1999). 
Staffing costs tend to be high, with competition for skilled development workers and 
shortages of staff willing to work in distressed areas. Additional staff resources are required 
for non-lending activities such as counselling, education and the marketing of financial 
services to a traumatised and suspicious population (Nagarajan 2000, USAID 2001e). The 
destruction of roads and telecommunications facilities increases transaction costs. Additional 
investment in security for program assets, staff and clients may be required. PCMFIs may 
find it necessary to incorporate additional emergency relief measures such as food donations, 
or social services such as primary health care and education. While such additions have the 
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positive effects of increasing client goodwill, outreach and loyalty, they add considerably to 
program costs (Doyle 1998). 
Commercialisation in PCEs: A Feasible Option? 
In the conflict aftennath, then, traditional promotional objectives assume a back seat in 
relation to protectional and social capital building objectives. This is of particular importance 
for the pursuit of FSS, as protectional and social intennediation activities do not generate the 
returns necessary to support full cost recovery and require a form of subsidy, either directly 
from donors or by cross-subsidies from more profitable activities. 
Among the key success factors for FSS identified in the 'best practices' literature are 
minimalist 'core' financial services, interest rates and fees set at full cost-recovery levels, and 
low operating costs relative to portfolio size. There is great difficulty in adapting these 
features to protectional and social capital-building functions. As social development 
interventions do not generate direct financial returns, they are likely to be supported by profit-
maximising programs only to the extent that they are seen as essential to the efficient delivery 
of core services. There is a risk that communities requiring substantial investment in social 
capital building will be avoided by such programs. Similarly, protectional strategies are 
unlikely to be profitable. Protectional loans are typically small, involving relatively high 
transaction costs, and they support activities which generate high social but low financial 
rates of return. 
Furthennore, while an overwhelmingly promotional focus is necessary for FSS, it is not 
sufficient. The large unit transactions characteristic of FSS generally require a strong 
microenterprise sector, which in tum depends on the presence of vigorous markets, sound 
infrastructure, well-developed human capital and a stable economic, political and legal 
environment (Snodgrass 1996, Shaw 2004). Most FSS programs, such as BancoSol in 
Bolivia, target non-poor, urban microentrepreneurs. Others, such as the ASA in Bangladesh, 
target poorer borrowers with smaller microenterprises, relying on a streamlined cost structure, 
minimalist financial-services only approach and the economies of scale generated by great 
breadth of outreach (more than 8 million clients in the case of ASA) (MicroBanking Bulletin 
2003). In PCEs, the profitability of promotional interventions is hampered by the low 
absorptive capacity of the microenterprise sector, with human capital depletion and severe 
disruption to markets and infrastructure. The capacity to expand breadth of outreach may be 
limited by security and demographic factors. In addition, there is often a high demand for 
unprofitable 'credit-plus' services to promote micro entrepreneurial capacity, with many new 
entrants to the infonnal sector, who need to learn new skills. 
Thus, expectations that MFIs in post-conflict environments can become commercially 
viable may be excessively optimistic. Empirical findings indicate that FSS is an elusive goal 
even under optimal political and socio-economic conditions, with evidence from a recent 
cross-country survey of 124 MFls that just over half meet strict tests of financial 
sustainability after a decade of more of assistanc,e (Microbanking Bulletin 2003). Moreover, . 
commercialisation may compromise protectional and social objectives, with findings that 
programs with explicitly social objectives are the least likely to cover their own costs 
(Morduch 2000), and that FSS institutions are less likely than other MFls to target poor 
clients (Microbanking Bulletin 2003). 
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Nevertheless, some key donors build FSS objectives into their support for post-conflict 
MFIs. World Bank-supported MFIs in the Bosnia Local Initiatives Project, for example, were 
required to become fully independent of subsidies after two years (Kuehnast 2001). While 
there is little data on the impacts of commercialisation on MFI operations in PCEs, there are 
indications that full cost recovery is problematic (Nagarajan 1999; Frasier and Saad 2003). A 
survey of 14 MFIs in PCEs in six countries found that none were able to meet their operating 
and financing costs from earned income. Of the three which met the less demanding criterion 
of operational self-sufficiency (covering operating costs from revenue), two were located in 
urbanised middle-income European settings (Doyle 1998). In addition, there is evidence that 
the pursuit of full cost recovery in PCMFIs impacts adversely on social capital formation 
(Bateman 2003), poverty targeting and non-financial services (USAID 200Ia). 
THE BOUGAINVILLE CONFLICT 
PNG lies to the north east of Australia and is the ~rgest nation in Micronesia. 
Bougainville is one of 19 provinces of PNG. It is located 500 kilometers east of the PNG 
mainland, and comprises one large island, 200 kilometres long and 40 kilometres wide, and a 
number of smaller islands. Its population just under 200,000, with over 40 per cent younger 
than 15 years of age (NSO 2002). The conflict in began in 1988 as a localised reaction to the 
on-going negative consequences of foreign-owned mining. While under Australia's 
administration in the 1960s, copper was discovered in Bougainville' s south eastern 
mountains. The ensuing mine was fully foreign-owned and while its profits were substantial, 
the royalties flowing to Bougainvilleans were insignificant. While other benefits from the 
mining included employment and some community development programs, the 
environmental exploitation and degradation caused by the mine over a twenty-year period 
was perceived by many Bougainvilleans to far outweigh these benefits. The PNG army and 
police reacted swiftly and harshly against the protestors and this response galvanised support 
resulting in a wider uprising centred on long-held claims for independence (Howley 2002; 
Spriggs and Denoon 1992). 
Conflict between the Bougainvilleans and PNG forces continued until 1997. Between 
15,000-20,000 people died, most of the island's infrastructure was destroyed (including 
schools, hospitals and roads), and all government services (including health and education) 
ceased operating. Further, conflict between Bougainvilleans also occurred. Not all 
Bougainvilleans were in favour of independence and at times, traditional land disputes, ethnic 
rivalries and other grievances between Bougainvilleans resulted in fighting and often 
overshadowed the larger issue of independence in terms of motivation for violence (Howley 
2002; Regan 1999,2002; Ogan 1999). 
The peace process was a protracted exercise taking nearly five years to complete. The 
final negotiated peace settlement, signed on 30 August 2001, allowed for an autonomous 
Bougainville government and the opportunity to vote on full independence within a 10-15 
year timeframe. This outcome represented a compromise for both sides as Bougainville was 
seeking full independence, whilst PNG opposed any move towards secession. 
The devastating consequences of the conflict, with the loss of physical assets, 
infrastructure and human support systems, and a severely traumatised civilian population, 
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constitute a major challenge to future economic development. Household asset bases 
including housing, land, livestock, tools and savings were partially or completely destroyed. 
Transport, power and communications facilities have been severely affected by combat 
damage. All significant roads were destroyed during the crisis, and the reconstruction 
program has been slow. Markets have been disrupted by popUlation displacement, heightened 
poverty and the destruction of transport links. Human capital has been depleted by war 
casualties, psychological trauma, the loss of health services, lapses in formal education and 
emigration. 
Scope for major economic development is limited. The almost complete reliance on the 
mine to underpin the 'economy meant that following the mine's closure in 1989, nearly all 
economic activity other than subsistence fanning ceased. Not only were 10,000 direct jobs 
lost, but all the indirect and associated industries also closed almost immediately (Regan 
2002). Wage employment is still extremely scarce, accounting for only 10 per cent of males 
and 4 per cent of females over the age of 10 (NSO 2002). Plantation agriculture, a potential 
source of jobs and export earnings, remains underdeveloped. While fishing and tourism may 
become increasingly important in the future, they will not make a significant contribution to 
growth in the short-term. In the current political environment there is little prospect of a 
resumption of mining in the foreseeable future. The economy is heavily reliant on aid and on 
cocoa and copra exports from the smallholder farm sector. 
MICROFINANCE IN BOUGAINVILLE 
The Bougainville Hause Moni (BHM) is the largest microfinance program in 
Bougainville. It comprises a loose federation of grassroots microfinance institutions (GMFIs) 
located throughout the island, coordinated and supported by a central body. AusAID has 
supported BHM since its inception in 1996, with an Australian NGO, Australian Volunteers 
Abroad, assuming the role of the Managing Contractor. The project's goal was to foster social 
and economic development through grassroots savings mobilisation, and its objectives 
focused on building institutional capacity, self-sufficiency and sustainability (AusAID 2001). 
In the face of strong public demand for micro finance services, the geographic reach of 
the project, limited to four pilot regions in the initial design, was broadened to cover the 
whole province. Between 2000 and 2004 the number of GMFIs grew from 42 to 333, and 
membership grew from just under 6,000 to around 20,000. The rapid expansion in outreach 
confirms the strength of public demand for financial services and has firmly established BHM 
as Bougainville's leading microfinance identity. Members see the program primarily as a tool 
for re-building social capital, providing savings facilities and small loans, primarily for non-
enterprise and protectional purposes such as school fees, customary obligations, and 
consumption-smoothing during lean seasons. Most have indicated strongly that their 
preference is for savings rather than loans, although some in the larger, urban GMFIs have 
indicated a preference for larger microenterprise loans. 
With the termination of the current project in 2005, it is planned that BHM will move' 
into a new phase, with the establishment of a Microbank. The emphasis of the forthcoming 
phase is on the achievement of full FSS by 2008. A further substantial expansion of scale is 
planned, with the goal of reaching 60,000 clients by 2008 (Asian Development Bank 2004). 
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While several key issues in the design of the next phase remain to be finalised, the general 
thrust of the proposal involves a significant shift in emphasis away from protectional and 
social capital-building services in remote areas, in favour of larger, promotional loans and a 
focus on clients in the island's three major economic centres, Buka, Arawa and Siwai. 
There is a case for sequencing PCMF interventions to focus initially on protection and 
social capital building, and subsequently, with the rebuilding of household asset bases and 
revival of economic activity, to shift the focus towards sustained income promotion. As the 
post-conflict trauma subsides, with the return of stability, normalisation of social relations and 
rebuilding of infrastructure, it is likely that improvements in operating conditions will reduce 
costs and improve client capacity to pay, allowing BHM to move progressively towards self-
sufficiency. 
The balance between re-building and development must be carefully managed, however. 
In Bougainville, the risk is that an excessive emphasis on cost recovery will compromise rural 
outreach. This risk arises from the high costs of meeting the specific needs of rural 
communities in the post-conflict environment. Remote regions are physically difficult and 
costly to reach, due to ongoing security concerns and dilapidated transport and 
communications infrastructure. Rural clients are poorer than their urban counterpmis, less 
accustomed to the cash economy and in need of more intensive social intermediation and 
maintenance. There is a need for non-financial microenterprise support services, particularly 
in remote areas. The building of grassroots institutional capacity and of social capital and 
credit discipline among the membership will require substantial investments in training, social 
mobilisation, awareness-raising and ongoing monitoring and maintenance. 
The remainder of this section describes other specific issues and challenges for the future 
development of micro finance in Bougainville. 
INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 
Substantial further investment is required in the building of grassroots institutional 
capacity if GMFIs are to expand into microenterprise lending. The rapid growth in outreach 
in recent years has outstripped BHM's capacity to screen, monitor and support the large 
number of new GMFI entrants. As a consequence, there has been limited progress towards the 
building of GMFI capacity, and there little development in the quality and scope of financial 
services available to clients. Management performance at GMFI level is weak, with little 
standardisation of practices and deficiencies in record management and reporting. The limited 
management capacity of GMFIs has so far proved sufficient to handle small-scale savings and 
lending activities, but it will need to be upgraded to meet any expansion in the scope of 
financial services to GMFI members. 
Weak Credit Discipline and Distrust of Financial Institutions 
Particular challenges for microfinance in Bougainville are imposed by the chequered 
history of financial sector development during and after the conflict, which has contributed to 
a weak credit culture and widespread distrust of financial institutions. The post-conflict 
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rebuilding of the fonnal financial sector has been minimaL Fonnal financial facilities, 
currently limited to a single branch of the South Pacific Bank in Buka at the extreme north of 
the island, are inaccessible to most Bougainvilleans as travel is prohibitively costly and time-
consuming. The weakness of the formal financial sector during the conflict and its aftermath 
has contributed to the emergence of a spate of pyramid money schemes into which vast 
quantities of household savings disappeared in the late 1990s. The promotion of microfinance 
was further set back by these schemes, which led many clients to withdraw their savings from 
existing financial institutions, decapitalising MFIs and contributing to a loss of confidence in 
legitimate finance providers. During and after the conflict people buried large sums of money 
to safeguard their wealth, and it is estimated that up to 20 million kina remains hoarded by 
households. 
The loss of confidence in financial institutions has been exacerbated by poorly managed 
donor-supported micro finance programs. The main alternative to BHM in recent years has 
been a credit scheme sponsored by the ED in collaboration with the Bougainville Provincial 
Council of Women, which is generally agreed to have been a failure, with largescale loan 
defaults and little evidence of client impact (Newsom 2002). Among the main factors in poor 
perfonnance were weak management capacity and the failure of the solidarity group system 
(AusAID 2001). This poorly managed program has contributed to the growth ofa 'cargo cult' 
mentality in which loans, especially those from offshore sources, are widely viewed as gifts. 
Furthermore, in Bougainville, as in other Pacific island societies where social and 
economic transactions are conditioned by the 'wantok' system, the building of a credit culture 
faces particular challenges. There is a need for rigour in pre-credit training and social 
mobilisation to counteract sociocultural influences which encourage nepotism and poor 
repayment discipline. 
Weak Social Capital 
Prior to 1989, over 10,000 Bougainvilleans were employed directly by the mine, with 
salaries that were very high by local standards. A serious consequence of this influx of wealth 
was the challenge to traditional power structures and community spirit. Young men were able 
to gain great influence in their home villages by buying gifts and sharing their wages, 
challenging traditional social hierarchies. The conflict exacerbated this breakdown by placing 
greater pressure on traditional power structures, a problem which has not been resolved in the 
post-conflict aftennath. Intra-group conflict has a long history (pre-dating colonialism) in 
Bougainville (Regan 1999b), but the recent period of conflict has exacerbated this situation. 
Despite a weapons disposal plan being part of the peace agreement, the de-commissioning has 
not been entirely effective (Regan 2002a). The result is still a heavily anned population with a 
recent history of reverting to violence to resolve disputes. Violence and outbursts of 
lawlessness continue to be a social problem (Howley 2002; Regan 1999b). Reconciliation and 
the building of trust and cooperation are central community development priorities. 
There are indications of success in rebuilding social capital, with some GMFIs engaging 
in community projects such as the restoration of church buildings, and establishing small-
scale cooperative economic ventures in animal husbandry and cocoa-drying. Expatriate aid 
workers report instances where GMFI participation has led to the re-establishment of relations 
between previously estranged families. While GMFIs have made significant contributions to 
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post-conflict reconciliation, levels of social cohesion and trust remain generally low, and need 
to be further developed to provide a viable basis for group-based lending, particularly in the 
rural central and southern districts. 
Microenterprise Development 
In the medium term at least, most households will remain reliant on informal sector 
livelihoods in the form of smallscale agriculture and non-farm microenterprises. The creation 
of sustainable local economic growth through microenterprise development is a key objective 
of BHM. However, micro enterprise-based income generation faces significant constraints, 
with the loss of household assets and physical infrastructure, weak markets and depletion of 
human capital. Ongoing intra-community tensions and weak law enforcement are added 
disincentives to microenterprise investment. In a largely subsistence-based economy, the 
scope and scale of micro enterprise opportunities is reduced, as customer demand tends to be 
limited to essentials. These obstacles, which are most severe in rural areas, impose severe 
limitations on development: while there has been some small business growth in Buka and 
Arawa in the post-conflict period, there is little evidence of microenterprise activity 
elsewhere. 
Some constraints, notably deficiencies in infrastructure and the rule of law, are beyond 
the scope of microfinance. Another important set of constraints, however, relates to a lack of 
awareness, information and skills for microenterprise development within the Bougainville 
community - problems which can and should be addressed by micro finance providers. Given 
the underdeveloped state of the micro enterprise sector in Bougainville, the building of 
microentrepreneurial awareness and capacity is key to the success of micro finance. 
There is a need for a credit-plus program aimed at promoting non-farm microenterprises 
and non-traditional farming activities. Although the cocoa sector is currently performing 
strongly, over-reliance on a single export crop is a high-risk strategy. The current high world 
price of cocoa is the result of political instability in the cocoa-producing West Africa region, 
and should not be expected to continue. Moreover, while cocoa-growing currently provides a 
useful and widespread income source in Bougainville, high population growth and increasing 
pressure on land resources will restrict access to cocoa income in the longer term (Bourke 
2003). 
Despite scope for diversification into non-farm activities in both urban and rural settings, 
the non-farm micro enterprise sector is remarkably under-developed in Bougainville. Potential 
microenterprise opportunities include animal husbandry, fishing, sustainable forestry, 
wholesale and retail trade, retail food production, construction-related activities, transport, 
services such as hairdressing and vehicle repairs, and handicrafts production. Credit-plus 
services targeting existing and prospective microentrepreneurs, particularly in rural areas, are 
key to the development of the microenterprise sector. Appropriate services in the 
Bougainville context include information on non-traditional opportunities, vocational and 
business management training, assistance in identifying and developing markets and in 
introducing sustainable low-cost technologies. Care must be exercise in the design and 
delivery of micro enterprise development services, as a large influx of new entrants to 
emerging occupations may create a problem of oversupply. 
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CONCLUSION 
Further research is required to analyse the feasibility and outreach implications of full 
cost recovery in PCEs, and to identify optimal sequencing arrangements and other best 
practices which minimise trade-offs between institutional financial viability and social and 
economic objectives. In post-conflict Bougainville, FSS may be a viable long-term objective. 
In the short- to medium-term, however, protectional financial services, social capital building, 
credit-plus microenterprise development and the strengthening of GMFI capacity are strategic 
priorities for microfinance. This is particularly the case in remote rural regions, where the 
pace of economic rebuilding has been slowest. For the BHM, the question is the extent to 
which a cost recovery-based model can support an expansion in rural outreach. If 
microfinance is to have a significant economic impact beyond the mostly non-poor minority 
population around Buka and Arawa, the additional costs of these interventions must be 
factored in. The BHM has the potential to make a major contribution to post-conflict re-
building and longer-term economic development, but it faces a range of complicated issues 
compounded by its location in a PCE and pressures from donors to adopt cost recovery 
objectives. These will require sensitive and careful management. Premature pressures to meet 
financial bottom lines introduce an added complexity which risks undermining this already 
complex process. 
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